

Analysing the Governance of the Cameroon Football Federation

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the governance of the Cameroon Football Federation (FECAFOOT) and its influence on football development. Employing stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), this qualitative single-case study addresses three objectives: to analyse FECAFOOT's strategies and policies, to examine its institutional relationship with the Ministry of Sports (MINSEP), and to describe stakeholder perceptions of how this relationship influences football development. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with fifteen purposively selected stakeholders and analysed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

The findings reveal a contradiction between formal institutional existence and practical governance effectiveness. First, governance is highly centralised around the federation president, with weak policy implementation, exclusion of key stakeholders, limited financial transparency, and chronic neglect of grassroots football. Second, the relationship with MINSEP is marked by persistent power struggle, with the 2014 Convention as the central point of contention and financial dependence limiting operational autonomy. Third, stakeholders perceive this relationship as directly impeding football development through stalled infrastructure, absent youth pathways, neglected referee development, and unstable club funding. The study concludes that FECAFOOT's fundamental challenge is not the absence of structures but the weak transformation of formal mechanisms into transparent and accountable practice. Recommendations include reducing executive centralisation and developing a long-term football master plan independent of electoral cycles.

Keywords:

Football governance, FECAFOOT, stakeholder theory, organisational performance, African football.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFCON	Africa Cup of Nations
ASC	Australian Sports Commission
BIBGIS	Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport
CAF	Confederation of African Football
CFAF	Central African CFA Franc (currency)
CHAN	African Nations Championship
FA	Football Association
FECAFOOT	Fédération Camerounaise de Football (Cameroon Football Federation)

FIFA	International Federation of Association Football
MINSEP	Ministère des Sports et de l'Éducation Physique
NQSA	Njalla Quan Sports Academy
NSF	National Sport Federation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SPARC	Sport and Recreation New Zealand
UN	United Nation

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1. Background Information

Football in Cameroon transcends sport; it functions as a powerful social and political force, uniting over 250 ethnic groups across French and English-speaking regions (Clarke & Ojo, 2016). The Cameroon Football Federation (Fédération Camerounaise de Football, hereafter FECAFOOT), established in 1959, serves as the governing body responsible for all football activities from grassroots to elite levels. Despite producing historic achievements including five Africa Cup of Nations titles and becoming the first African nation to reach the FIFA World Cup quarterfinals in 1990, Cameroonian football has been persistently undermined by governance crises. These crises manifest as administrative instability, allegations of corruption, government interference, and financial mismanagement, leading to multiple FIFA suspensions (Che, 2013).

Governance in sports federations encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, including policy formulation, financial oversight, stakeholder management, strategic planning, and ethical compliance. In Cameroon these functional areas are often complicated by socio-political factors, which are external pressures from global bodies, limited resources, and cultural norms. Besides, Articles 13 and 17 of the FIFA's statutes require member associations to maintain independence from third-party interference, yet in Cameroon, the Ministry of Sports and Physical Education (MINSEP) often exerts influence, leading to conflicts (Che, 2013). The government through MINSEP keeps intervening because FECAFOOT depends on the government for finances, which this subsidy provides, as funds come with strings attached. So, the study will explore these intricacies, drawing on empirical data from recent events, such as the 2025 elective assembly and ongoing disputes over coaching appointments.

FECAFOOT is a member of the Confederation of African Football (CAF) and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). At club level, Cameroonian teams were the first elite teams to have won the African Champions League (FECAFOOT, 2022, para. 1).

Yet, to an extent, this unity has been facing some shortcomings recently within FECAFOOT. Conversely, governance issues emerged as early as the 1960s and 1970s, which saw the state involvement in sports as part of broader development policies, with Decree n°72/600 31 October 1972, Organization of the national football team (Mvo'o, 2021). This marks the beginning of a controversial relationship between FECAFOOT and the government, where the latter (government) views football as a public good warranting oversight. According to Hoyer and Parent (2017), when an organisation or federation at the micro level is directed and controlled, then it is corporate governance.

In regard to FECAFOOT, when the state directs and controls FECAFOOT through the appointment of coaches, working in line with the February 5 convention between MINSEP/FECAFOOT due to the state funding the federation and deeming it wise for auditing, it follows FIFA statutes of no third-party

interference, giving FECAFOOT full autonomy. Also, FECAFOOT works in accordance with FIFA and CAF regulations. President of FECAFOOT Samuel Eto'o: serious ban issues concerning signing a contract with 1XBet (betting company) is a call for consent which falls against norms of FIFA, CAF and FECAFOOT. Another ban during this end of AFCON Morocco due to misbehaviour and also the Women's Under-20 World Cup – all these are to be addressed for the betterment of the federation and do not portray a good image of the country.

Academic literature was analysed by Mvo'o (2021, para. 1), showing how the Cameroon Football Federation witnessed an insane succession of leaders from 1960 to 2010 as head of the federation, which looked like a political carnival due to scandals. These presidents were dismissed, some sent to prison, and replaced by Provisional Management Committee and letter to the Standardisation Committee, which describes this as a "political carnival", where leadership changes were frequent, often imposed by the state through Provisional Management Committees. Politico-legal orientations dominated, with laws like No. 96/09 of 1996 on sports activities attempting to clarify roles but resulting in ambiguities.

To an extent, economically, government subsidies, FIFA grants, and sponsorships are factors that FECAFOOT relies on to survive and function well. Financial rules emphasise integrity and fair play, yet allegations of match-fixing and mismanagement persist (**Darby, 2002**). The national team not qualifying for the 2026 World Cup is a result of declining performance, which links up to governance lapses.

Next, football governance affects youth development, inclusion, and gender equity socially. Insufficient stadiums are hindering the development of youth leagues, elite teams and female leagues, like the Guinness Super League for women. My study will address the existing literature gaps, which often focus on specific issues or crises rather than holistic governance.

1.2 Research Problem

Internal and external factors have always disturbed the smooth functioning of FECAFOOT. The governance of FECAFOOT is in crisis, where the need for structural transparent management is a necessity for the good of the national team and league.

Most studies of the past have concentrated on African football in general, but little or none have been specific to Cameroonian football. Thus critically there is a gap which I seek to fill, which is how specific FECAFOOT policies and their relationship with the government of Cameroon directly or indirectly influence the performance of the national team, league local clubs, and the overall structural development of the sport as a whole in Cameroon.

Governance of the FECAFOOT which is the problem I seek to find.

Therefore, the governance of FECAFOOT is the central problem this study seeks to investigate, understand, and propose remedies for.

1.3 Aim of this Study

This study aims to examine how FECAFOOT is governed in light of its objectives. By providing evidence-based recommendations that address governance challenges and restore the competitiveness of Cameroonian football.

1.4 Research Question

This particular study aims to answer the following research question and objectives:

1. How is FECAFOOT governed?

1.5 Research Objectives

1. To analyse the strategies or policies of the FECAFOOT.
2. To analyse the relationship between FECAFOOT and the government.

3. To describe stakeholder perceptions of how the relationship between FECAFOOT and the government influences football development in Cameroon.

1.6 Significance of the Research

This study holds significance across three domains.

Academically, the thesis contributes to sport management literature by providing a detailed African case study of football governance, filling empirical data gaps specific to Cameroon, and testing the applicability of stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) within a developing-country sport federation context.

Practically, for FECAFOOT, this study offers evidence-based recommendations to enhance transparency, accountability, and efficiency. For MINSEP and the Government of Cameroon, the findings clarify how to balance state involvement with FIFA autonomy requirements, thereby reducing the risk of suspensions and sanctions. For CAF and FIFA, the research informs targeted support mechanisms for member associations facing similar governance challenges.

Socially, the study is expected to improved football governance directly which enables youth engagement, gender equality in women's football, inclusive participation across all ten regions, infrastructural development, and national unity. These outcomes align with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 3 (good health and well-being), 4 (quality education), 5 (gender equality), and 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions).

1.7 Definition of Key Terms

Governance: For the purpose of this study, governance is operationally defined as the process of directing, controlling, and holding accountable a sport organisation (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2013, p. 12). This includes policy formulation, financial oversight, stakeholder management, strategic planning, ethical compliance, and the relationships between the federation and external actors. In the context of FECAFOOT, governance refers to how decisions are made by the Executive Committee and General Assembly, how resources are allocated to clubs and leagues, how the federation interacts with the Ministry of Sports (MINSEP), and how accountability is demonstrated to stakeholders including players, referees, sponsors, and fans.

Limitation of the Study

Difficulty to have relevant information that will be useful.

Inaccurate data from Fecafoot officials and MINSEP.

Language barriers since most people speak French.

Summary of the Study

This chapter focuses on the football governance of Fecafoot by introducing and giving background to what other researchers have discovered and researched. Again, it explains when Fecafoot was created and their achievements, explains the problems, aims, one research question that seek to answer, and three objectives that this study seeks to achieve, significance of the study, definition of key terms, and finally limitations faced during the research.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

This chapter is structured to align with the research objectives and it is presented in a format that entails conceptual review, theoretical review and empirical review. The conceptual reviews presents definitions and clarifications of concepts, theoretical review presents theoretical perspectives and the empirical review focuses on the scientific evidence about the topic.

2.1 The Conceptual Review

This part present literature specifically focusing on explaining concepts that are central to the research.

2.1.1 Governance

Governance is a contested concept with multiple definitions across disciplines, yet a clear operational definition is essential for any empirical study of sport organisations (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). At its broadest level, the United Nations (2014) defines governance as the process by which decisions are made and implemented within any organised society or institution. This definition, while useful for its simplicity, lacks the specificity required for analysing sport federations such as FECAFOOT.

Henry and Lee (2004) provide a sport-specific framework, describing governance across three levels: systematic governance (cooperative relationships between organisations), organisational governance (management of administration and norms), and political governance (relationships between organisations and governing bodies). They argue that principles such as autonomy, democracy, ethical standards, accountability, and financial transparency are essential for preventing external interference and protecting stakeholder representation. These principles align closely with stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), which emphasises enhancing relationships between the state, federation members, and institutions to achieve common goals.

Within international sport governance, Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2013, p. 12) offer a definition specifically tailored to sport federations: governance is "the process of directing, controlling, and holding accountable an organisation." They identify seven core principles of good governance: organisational transparency, reporting transparency, stakeholder representation, democratic process, control mechanisms, sport integrity, and solidarity. These principles can be measured using the Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport (BIBGIS) tool, which has been applied to various international sport governing bodies (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2019). The growing academic and policy interest in governance, according to Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2019), is driven by the need to prevent scandals and reform sports organisations, making governance frameworks particularly relevant for federations such as FECAFOOT that have experienced repeated crises.

2.2.1 Autonomy and Government Interference

The principle of autonomy is central to the governance of sport federations under the FIFA regulatory framework. FIFA statutes (2025, Article 14) explicitly require member associations to manage their affairs independently without interference from third parties, including government ministries, with sanctions to follow upon violation. This requirement positions FECAFOOT as an organisation that must manage its relationship with stakeholders independently, implying autonomous power over its administrative, sporting, and technical affairs.

The pattern of government interference is not unique to Cameroon. FIFA has suspended multiple member

associations for political interference throughout its history, including the Republic of Congo, Pakistan (Reuters, 2025), Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Brunei, Indonesia, and Kuwait (Gazeta Express, 2021). Russia was also suspended following state invasion of Ukraine, though that suspension was based on broader geopolitical grounds rather than interference in federation governance specifically (Ndei, 2024). These international precedents demonstrate that the Cameroon case, while distinct in its specific legal framework (the 2014 Convention), reflects a broader global tension between state sovereignty over sport and FIFA's assertion of federation independence.

The 2025 FECAFOOT elections illustrate the depth of the governance crisis. Only one candidate, Samuel Eto'o, stood for the presidency, reflecting either consolidated support or the successful exclusion of potential challengers through licensing requirements. MINSEP publicly opposed the elections and refused to send government representatives to observe the process (Cameroon Online, 2025; Sakar, 2025). Despite these pressures, Eto'o secured his second mandate. African Daily News Egypt (2025) noted that this electoral episode reveals a qualitative gap in democratic governance that demands investigation. As this study's findings will demonstrate, stakeholder inclusion is a necessary condition for resolving these structural conflicts.

2.1.2 Relationship between FECAFOOT and the Government

This subsection addresses the second research objective by examining the statutory and operational relationship between FECAFOOT and the Ministry of Sports and Physical Education (MINSEP).

The legal foundation of this relationship is the presidential decree of 2014 concerning the organisation and management of national football teams (The President of the Republic, 2014). This decree established joint financing arrangements between FECAFOOT and MINSEP, subjected FECAFOOT to state checks and balances, while granting FECAFOOT control over the administrative, sporting, and technical management of national teams. In 2015, Article 9 of the MINSEP-FECAFOOT Convention required that the two parties consult each other before the appointment of national team coaches (MINSEP & FECAFOOT, 2015).

However, this legal framework has produced persistent tension rather than harmonious collaboration. In 2019, the government appointed Portuguese coach Conceição without meaningful FECAFOOT consultation, though the federation did not aggressively contest the appointment (Njie Enow, 2019). The 2024 appointment of Marc Brys provoked a much more severe conflict, with FECAFOOT publicly rejecting the appointment and the government defending its right to appoint coaches it funds (BBC, 2024; Africanews, 2024).

Recent conflicts have escalated. MINSEP opposed the 2025 FECAFOOT elections and refused to send government representatives to observe the process (Cameroon Online, 2025; Sakar, 2025). Following the elections, FECAFOOT sacked Marc Brys as national team coach without consulting MINSEP, leading to further legal and political disputes (The Guardian Post Cameroon, 2025). The federation appointed David Pagou as Brys's replacement, but the government subsequently took administrative action against Pagou, who is a physical education teacher employed by MINSEP, reassigning him to a remote posting.

2.1.3 The Effect of Current Governance on Organisational Performance

This subsection addresses the third research objective by examining how governance deficiencies translate into measurable performance outcomes across national teams, clubs, and the domestic league.

The performance record of Cameroonian football under current governance arrangements has been poor across multiple dimensions. The men's national team failed to qualify for the 2026 FIFA World Cup. The women's national team failed to qualify for the Women's Africa Cup of Nations. Junior teams (under-17, under-20, under-23) have not won any continental trophies in recent cycles. Since Samuel Eto'o assumed the FECAFOOT presidency in 2021, no Cameroonian club has advanced to the group stage of any CAF

interclub competition (Champions League or Confederation Cup). No club has won a CAF trophy during this period. Domestic infrastructure remains inadequate, with insufficient stadiums, training facilities, and competition venues across the ten regions.

The FIFA Professional Footballers' Association (FIFPRO, 2024) documented that players in Cameroon are urging FECAFOOT to collaborate with clubs to resolve non-payment crises. Club presidents consistently complain that they do not receive promised subsidies from FECAFOOT, which in turn prevents them from paying player salaries on time. This financial instability at the club level directly affects player welfare and competitive performance.

Che (2013) argued that FIFA bans on FECAFOOT due to government interference and corruption have consequences beyond administrative sanctions. Suspensions prevent clubs and national teams from participating in international competitions, which in turn reduces competitive exposure for players, limits talent development opportunities, and damages the commercial value of Cameroonian football. The cumulative effect of repeated governance failures has been to drain talent, reduce performance, and erode the international competitiveness that Cameroon once enjoyed.

2.2 Theoretical Review

Theoretical review focuses on perspectives based on theories. This study focused on stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) and used it as basis for its argument.

The father of stakeholder theory Freeman (1984) adopted it for sport, insisting that effective governance will require identifying all stakeholders and evaluating their salience, which is power in controlling resources required by the federation. Legitimacy in the right of membership and voting, urgency in selection to compete (Mitchell et al., 1997), thereby engaging them in a responsible way for all to be valued. In FECAFOOT, MINSEP is a government external power stakeholder with legitimacy as national oversight yet often using undue urgency and power, thereby conflicting with FIFA's autonomy and interference by third parties. So, paving the way for the "stakeholder dilemma" to set in whereby federations such as FECAFOOT will struggle to balance claims, often leading to separate governance, thus reducing its capacity (Shilbury & Ferkins, 2011).

To him, external stakeholders are fans and communities, television providers, sport venues, food and merchandise vendors and suppliers, sponsors and sport betting platforms. While external stakeholders such as athletes, team and league ownership, and executives, and team and league personnel. He insisted that fans and communities are the reasons why sport exists and are the most obvious external stakeholders, whereas athletes are the main internal stakeholders, the product put out by the league and federation.

Furthermore, this theory is about how in a business the interest of the business is not all about the interest of the business owner, but first the interest of the people who patronise the business should be considered first, and they are the stakeholders whose interest should always be considered first. So, for the football business to be progressive in Cameroon, the interests of the stakeholders who patronise the football must be taken into consideration.

External or secondary, which are affected stakeholders in line with Freeman's definition of stakeholder theory, are as follows: Fans and communities, clubs, government authorities (MINSEP), and sponsors such as MTN, 1Xbet, and Guinness. FIFA and CAF, as international governing bodies, affiliate, regulate, and always investigate FECAFOOT. In my methodology, I will select the stakeholders with whom I will work, which falls in line with stakeholder theory because they are the people who have an interest and experience in football, either through investment, as club president, players, fans, or politicians (MINSEP), FECAFOOT officials, and they all have a stake within the Cameroon football federation. Overhand, they

have an interest to protect within FECAFOOT, which is what makes them stakeholders. The people in charge of governance in FECAFOOT are these same football stakeholders, which still confirmed the stakeholders' theory. Therefore, in a system that is made of stakeholders, each stakeholder has an interest that he or she is defending within the system.

Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) insisted that organisations like FECAFOOT must manage their relationships with all stakeholders for the sustainability of the organisation. Furthermore, the MINSEP and FECAFOOT autonomy conflict needs to be settled. Freeman (1984) highlighted that for every organisation to succeed, it will depend on the needs, goals and motivation of its members as they interact as an organisation. In addition, this theory ensures that to have improved outcomes in a national sport organisation, the interests of everyone need to be equal because they all aim to enhance transparency and accountability (Kasale et al., 2019).

Applying stakeholder theory to FECAFOOT, the government acts as a multi-actor using power to influence decisions of FECAFOOT, undermining federation autonomy by funding FECAFOOT and overseeing, which always leads to conflict between FECAFOOT and the government acting as a major shareholder (Che, 2013). FECAFOOT should include fans, players, and clubs in decision-making to improve performance from a stakeholder perspective.

Ferrand and McCarthy (2009) views stakeholder theory as based on system theory. Where managers should move away from an organisation-based approach – that is, they should not only manage for the benefit of the organisation but also for the benefit of everyone that is not included in the organisation through relationships with everyone. In short, when the primary aim of the manager is to balance or manage the relationship of stakeholders so that objectives of the organisation can be achieved.

2.3 Empirical Review

This section presents scientific evidence about sport governance in relation to the present study. Chenuei et al. (2025) carried out a study using a mixed sequential nested research design, purposive sampling technique, 615 participants, and stakeholder theory and found out that so many factors cause conflict in the management of Cameroon football, such as strategic protests, corruption, and stakeholders boycotting events, which has an impact that needs to be addressed by including stakeholders in decision-making. David (2024) found out that corporate governance practices were applicable and useful for sport governance in Kenyan federations. Using cross-sectional survey design and linear regression analysis, this thesis shows that there was weak implementation of these principles, which is due to stakeholder conflict, echoing the turmoil within FECAFOOT. Therefore, applying the principles such as board effectiveness, transparency, accountability, audit, and performance evaluation will obviously bring positive results and expose shortcomings of the federation.

Clarke and Ojo (2016) indicated that sport, including football, in Cameroon is controlled by the government. Using document analysis and interviews, financial scandals, corruption, and insufficient accountability were recorded as the main factors hindering performance. The government providing subsidies to FECAFOOT set in as a breakthrough to bypass stakeholders like FECAFOOT autonomy and impose decisions on FECAFOOT. The crisis was inherited and was not created by FECAFOOT.

On the earth's surface, this crisis is an administrative issue, but in reality, it is a symptom of a country where Institutions do not operate independently; rules bend to power, and every sector is politicised from the top down, undermining autonomy for institutions or federations and democracy. Concluding that if Cameroon does not undergo core governance transformation, institutions, whether federations, councils, or ministries, will never stop clashing, malfeasance and malfunction will persist, and they will thereby disappoint the people they were meant to serve (True Cameroon, 2025). According to Foute (2024), FECAFOOT president Samuel Eto'o is in a power struggle with politicians like the MINSEP minister; it is just an inch from facing

FIFA sanctions since they are interfering with FECAFOOT decisions and bypassing the FIFA status of a federation to not be interfered with by a third party.

2.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter reviewed literature on sport governance, focusing on three areas aligned with the research objectives. The conceptual review established that governance in sport federations involves directing, controlling, and holding organisations accountable (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2013), with principles including transparency, stakeholder representation, and democratic process. The review of FECAFOOT's relationship with MINSEP revealed that the 2014 Convention, intended to clarify responsibilities, has instead become a source of persistent tension. Financial dependence on government subsidies significantly limits federation autonomy. The empirical review demonstrated that governance deficiencies translate into poor organisational performance, including low league competitiveness, match-fixing linked to referee non-payment, and national team decline (Che, 2013; FIFPRO, 2024). The theoretical review adopted stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) as the study's framework, emphasising that effective governance requires balancing the interests of all stakeholders, including MINSEP, players, clubs, referees, journalists, and fans. The literature confirms a significant gap: no systematic study has analysed how the FECAFOOT-government relationship influences football development in Cameroon. This study fills that gap through multi-stakeholder qualitative inquiry.

CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodological framework employed to investigate the governance of the Cameroon Football Federation (FECAFOOT). The chapter presents the research design, population, sampling, data collection and data analysis methods.

3.2 Research Design

The research design is a qualitative case study design. Following Yin (2018), a case study design is appropriate when the research question asks "how" or "why" about a contemporary phenomenon over which the researcher has little control. The central research question of this thesis asks how FECAFOOT is governed, how its policies are implemented, how its relationship with MINSEP functions, and how governance affects organisational performance. FECAFOOT constitutes the single case. The single-case design is justified because FECAFOOT represents a critical case for testing and refining stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) within an African sport federation context (Yin, 2018).

3.3 Population, Sampling and Sample Size

The population of the study consisted of the following stakeholder categories: journalists and media officers, former players, former coaches, referees, FECAFOOT officials or delegates, a former MINSEP secretary general, a fan with extensive football knowledge. Gender representation both female participants and male participants but women are general small. This is reflecting the broader underrepresentation of women in Cameroonian football governance structures (FECAFOOT, 2021, Article 3). Geographically, participants represent seven of Cameroon's ten regions.

Sampling Technique

The researcher used purposive sampling to select participants who possess relevant experience and expertise in Cameroon football governance (Patton, 2015). Purposive sampling is the preferred method in qualitative research for identifying and selecting information-rich cases that provide deep insight into the phenomenon under study. Inclusion criteria were: (a) age 18 years or older, (b) a minimum of five years of direct

experience in Cameroonian football as an official, player, coach, referee, journalist, club administrator, or fan, and (c) willingness to be audio-recorded and to have anonymised quotations used in the thesis. Snowball sampling (Goodman, 1961) was employed as a supplementary method. Initial participants were asked to recommend other knowledgeable individuals within their professional networks who might be willing to participate.

Sample Size

A sample of fifteen participants was recruited. This sample size is consistent with qualitative case study research, where depth of analysis is prioritised over statistical generalisability (Merriam, 1998). Data saturation was reached after participant thirteen, defined as the point at which no new themes emerged from consecutive interviews. Two additional interviews were conducted to confirm saturation.

Table 1: Participants' Demographic Summary

Participant	Gender	Position / Role / Experience
P1	Male	Vice president of the Cameroon Association of Sports Journalists, CAF Media officer, 20 years.
P2	Male	Formal player coach 30 years
P3	Male	Journalist 17 years
P4	Male	Journalist 10 years
P5	Male	Journalist 14 years
P6	Male	Fan 25 years
P7	Male	Formal player 33 years
P8	Male	Formal player, coach, works at MINSEP 37 years
P9	Male	Formal player, elite one referee 11 years
P10	Male	Formal referee, stadium director, formal secretary general at Bafut Rangers, now in referee commission for appointing referees. 40 years.
P11	Male	CEO of Njalla Quan Sports Academy (NQSA). Formal 4 th Vice president of FECAFOOT who resigned. 27 years.
P12	Female	Formal footballer, team president, first African woman with CAF A license coach, delegate of FECAFOOT, an Olympian. 18 years.
P13	Male	Formal national team player still playing the league, 20 years.
P14	Male	Formal secretary general at the MINSEP, 53 years.
P15	Male	FECAFOOT delegate formal player, national team coach and league. Club president, 25 years.

3.4 Method of Data Collection

The methods employed in the data collection process are explained in the following subheadings.

3.4.1 Semi-Structured Interview

A semi-structured interview guide was developed based on the three research objectives. Questions were designed to be open-ended, non-leading, and culturally appropriate for Cameroonian participants. The guide was reviewed by the thesis supervisor and piloted with two participants (a former elite player and a regional league president) who were not included in the final sample. Pilot testing refined the wording of three questions, reduced the estimated interview duration from ninety to sixty minutes, and confirmed that the questions were understood as intended across in English

The interview guide covered the following core areas: (a) the participant's background and involvement in Cameroonian football; (b) how policy decisions are made within FECAFOOT and who is included or excluded; (c) examples of implemented and unimplemented policies; (d) the participant's assessment of the FECAFOOT-MINSEP relationship and specific incidents illustrating that relationship; (e) the participant's understanding of the 2014 Convention.

3.4.2 Data Collection Procedures

Data collection was conducted over three months. Interviews were conducted according in English. Each interview lasted between forty-five and seventy-five minutes, with an average duration of fifty-eight minutes. All interviews were audio-recorded using two recording devices simultaneously (a primary smartphone recorder and a backup digital voice recorder) to prevent data loss due to technical failure. Recordings were transcribed verbatim by the researcher within forty-eight hours of each interview.

3.5 Data Analysis

Thematic analysis, as described by Braun and Clarke (2006), was used to analyse the interview transcripts. Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within qualitative data. It is theoretically flexible and well-suited to interpretivist research. The researcher read and re-read each transcript multiple times while listening to the original audio recordings. Initial observations and potential patterns were noted in a reflexive journal. This phase ensured that the researcher was deeply familiar with the breadth and depth of the data before any formal coding began. Codes were descriptive labels that captured the content or topic of a segment. Codes were grouped into broader candidate themes. Themes that were too narrow were merged with related themes. Themes that lacked sufficient data to be meaningful were discarded. This phase resulted in a refined set of themes aligned with the three research objectives. Each final theme was clearly defined, and a concise name was assigned. Themes were written up with illustrative participant quotations (presented in Chapter 4).

3.6 Ethical Considerations

This study was conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the Russian International Olympic University. Prior to each interview, participants received a participant information sheet explaining the study's purpose, procedures, potential risks and benefits, and their rights as research participants. All participants signed a consent form acknowledging their voluntary participation and their right to withdraw without penalty at any point prior to the completion of data analysis. Participants are identified in this thesis by codes (P1 through P15) only.

3.7 Trustworthiness and Rigour

Following Lincoln and Guba (2013), four criteria establish trustworthiness in qualitative research: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

Credibility

Credibility refers to the confidence that findings accurately represent participant realities. To establish credibility, member checking was employed: transcripts were returned to three participants (P1, P8, P12) for verification of accuracy and interpretation. All three confirmed that transcripts accurately represented their views. Additionally, peer debriefing was conducted with a fellow Master of Sports Administration student who was not involved in the research. The peer reviewed the coding framework and theme definitions, offering critique that refined the analysis.

Transferability

Transferability refers to the extent to which findings can be applied to other contexts. Rather than claiming generalisability, this study provides thick description (Lincoln & Guba, 2013) of the research context, participant characteristics, governance environment, and specific historical and institutional conditions of Cameroonian football. This thick description enables readers to assess the applicability of findings to other African sport federation contexts.

CHAPTER 4

Findings and Discussion

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings based on the sequence of the three research objectives. The findings of this study conducted through semi-structured interviews with 15 purposively sampled stakeholders are presented in Chapter 4, as discussed according to the literature reviewed in Chapter Two. The key objective was to answer the central research question, "How is FECAFOOT governed and implemented, and how do stakeholders perceive this relationship to influence the development of football in Cameroon?" and how FECAFOOT's governance has been examined through three research objectives, which facilitated the systematic exploration of various aspects of governance by FECAFOOT. A clear link among the theoretical framework (Stakeholder Theory – Freeman, 1984), literature review, coded thematic analysis, and findings of the study (each participant's perspective) provides an overview of how governance at FECAFOOT is currently structured. This research analysed the interviews by using Braun & Clarke's (2006) approach. The data were transcribed verbatim, read carefully, and initial inductive codes were generated from the responses given by study participants. The codes were grouped together, reviewed, and developed into themes, using the three research objectives and stakeholder theory to help guide the deductive development of the themes. Here are some examples of how the themes were generated:

The responses "decisions come from top to bottom", "the president imposes his ideas", and "the General Assembly only rubber stamps" were grouped together to form Theme 1 under RO1 (Highly Centralised Governance Structure).

Similarly, by grouping all of the references to "power tussle", "fight for control", and conflicts over the appointment of coaches, Theme 1 was developed under RO2 (Persistent Institutional Power Struggle).

Lastly, statements such as "referees are not paid", "match-fixing is everywhere", and "clubs do not receive their subventions" were clustered together to form Theme 2 under RO3 (Widespread Match-fixing and Referee Corruption). The application of this process ensured that only themes supported by the data from multiple participants across different groups of stakeholders were retained. The final themes identified from the research objectives will be outlined below.

4.1.1 RO1: To Analyse the Strategies and Policies of FECAFOOT

The responses were grouped into various themes and presented in the subsequent subtopics below.

Theme 1: Highly Centralized Governance Structure

The most dominant finding across respondents is that FECAFOOT operates within a governance arrangement that is formally institutionalized but highly centralized around the office of the president. Respondents repeatedly acknowledged the presence of the General Assembly, Executive Committee, and specialist committees, but many argued that these organs function more as legitimizing bodies than autonomous deliberative institutions.

Some respondents explained that, on paper, FECAFOOT appears democratic. Respondent 12 stated that "decisions are not taken by the president unilaterally." However, the broader respondent body consistently returned to the view that the president remains the effective source of final control. Respondent 1 declared: *"What is in FECAFOOT these days is that there is a kind of dictatorship in place where decisions that are supposed to come from bottom to top rather come from top to bottom. The president brings his ideals or decisions and uses his people who are in the general assembly to impose the decision on the whole body."*

Theme 2: Weak Policy Implementation

A strong recurring finding is that FECAFOOT is perceived as an institution rich in policy declarations but weak in implementation. Several respondents pointed to unrealised infrastructural commitments. A fan with 25 years of experience stated:

"To build 10 stadiums all over the country, they promised to professionalise the league, increase salaries of coaches and players, prioritize women and youth football—all these were made by President Eto'o but since 2021 only one policy of increasing salaries has been made."

A former FECAFOOT vice president offered a similar critique: "Nothing has been done as compared to the current president's campaign promises during his first mandate." Respondent 12 acknowledged that "infrastructure is available but not enough," explaining that "futsal does not have a specific field" and "some regions do not have football fields."

Theme 3: Exclusion of Key Stakeholders from Governance

A major contradiction emerged between formal stakeholder representation and substantive stakeholder influence. While FECAFOOT contains representatives from divisional leagues, elite clubs, referees, and regional delegates, many participants identified journalists, fans, grassroots clubs, and players as notably absent. A journalist and CAF media officer provided a detailed inventory:

"List of people who don't have representatives: No fans, no community, no government, no journalist, no stadium directors, no sponsors. The decision-making process of FECAFOOT has never been inclusive; even now there is no inclusivity in it."

Players reported feeling marginalized. A national team player explained: "I think we as players are not really involved in decision-making, and we wish to be involved."

Theme 4: Inadequate and Uneven Football Infrastructure

Across participants, there was broad agreement that FECAFOOT lacks sufficient independent football infrastructure. A former player and coach explained:

"The development of football infrastructure is unevenly distributed. Teams that are not within major towns find it very difficult to have very good stadia. It is very expensive for teams to rent and use major stadiums... so most teams prefer to use substandard stadiums that are not really of FIFA or CAF standards."

Respondent 12 noted that "futsal does not have a specific field" and "beach soccer is played in Kribi." Respondent 14 stated that "government owns most infrastructure" and that "FECAFOOT rents these fields."

Theme 5: Limited Financial Transparency and Accountability

Across respondents, there was repeated frustration about unclear sponsorship income, selective distribution of subventions, and lack of public financial disclosure. A former FECAFOOT vice president stated:

"We have never seen a single financial statement if you go online, while the South African Football

Association, CAF and FIFA always publish theirs... I never knew any income or official source of revenue of FECAFOOT. The information is classified as 'Top Secret'."

Respondent 12 openly admitted that "the distribution of resources are mostly at the elite level; it is not fair. Grassroots or amateur clubs do not benefit from it. No subvention."

4.1.2 RO2: The Relationship between FECAFOOT and the Government

Responses were organized into five themes presented below.

Theme 1: Persistent Institutional Power Struggle

Across virtually all respondents, the relationship between FECAFOOT and MINSEP is persistently tense, marked by institutional rivalry. Respondents used descriptors such as "fight," "power tussle," "heated debates," and "tense." A journalist stated simply: "The relationship between FECAFOOT and the government is tense." A former MINSEP secretary general attributed the tension to a failure to respect existing legal frameworks: "There is misunderstanding because they don't respect the laws." Respondent 13 stated bluntly that "the relationship is a fight for power."

Theme 2: The 2014 Convention as Central Point of Contention

Nearly every respondent identified the 2014 Convention as the foundational legal instrument regulating the relationship, but also as the principal source of conflict. A sports journalist explained that the convention "gave the government the powers which they were looking for and also opened FECAFOOT to the mercy of the government." A referee summarised: "The 2014 convention is the main cause of this tense atmosphere."

Theme 3: Financial Dependence Undermines Autonomy

A recurring theme was that FECAFOOT's heavy reliance on government funding compromises its independence. A sports journalist articulated:

"The overdependence of the federation on the government in terms of finance has left the federation at the beck and call of the government because the federation is funded by the government in so many aspects—running the national team, paying tickets and bonuses for players, giving contracts to coaches."

A former FECAFOOT vice president acknowledged: "The government is the biggest funder of FECAFOOT activities; that's the simple truth."

Theme 4: Coach Appointment as Primary Flashpoint

No issue appeared more symbolically charged than the appointment of national team coaches. The 2024 appointment of Marc Brys generated significant controversy. A journalist explained: "The government appointed Marc Brys as head coach, and we saw a kind of friction existed between the government backing him as coach and FECAFOOT never having a good working relationship with him." A former FECAFOOT vice president linked this conflict directly to outcomes: "We wasted time fighting with the technical bench... the result as we failed to qualify for the World Cup 2026."

Theme 5: Lack of Genuine Accountability Mechanisms

While formal accountability procedures exist on paper, respondents consistently argued that these mechanisms remain largely internal, restricted to a small circle of insiders, and inaccessible to the broader football public. A former FECAFOOT vice president described how government funds are handled through proper channels, including budget submissions to the Prime Minister's office and designated accounting officers from the Ministry of Finance. However, he noted that despite these formal processes, serious problems arise when clubs complain they have not received subventions, yet FECAFOOT claims payments have been made. This discrepancy between documented disbursements and actual club receipts suggests that accountability exists as a procedural ritual rather than a substantive check on resource distribution. A referee offered the most critical assessment, stating:

"FECAFOOT does not give any annual reports, and there is no accountability to the public. No auditing of FECAFOOT since the president alone decides what happens. No justification; everything exists only on paper that has never been implemented. They give accountability only on a few occasions, and it is not fair or inclusive because all stakeholders aren't aware of details. This money is not given to these stakeholders; it is a fake justification to ask for more money."

This finding reveals that while FECAFOOT and MINSEP may maintain procedural reporting between themselves, this reporting does not translate into public transparency, broad stakeholder confidence, or open financial legitimacy. Accountability exists as an institutional ritual among insiders, not as a participatory governance ethic visible to clubs, players, media, supporters, and the football community at large.

4.1.3 RO3: To describe stakeholder perceptions of how the relationship between FECAFOOT and the government influences football development in Cameroon

The third research objective sought to describe how stakeholders perceive the influence of the FECAFOOT-government relationship on football development in Cameroon. Across interviews, respondents consistently linked the tense, conflictual relationship between the two institutions to specific developmental failures in infrastructure, youth pathways, referee systems, club stability, and overall football growth. Five dominant themes emerged.

Stalled Infrastructure Development Due to Legal Ambiguity

Respondents widely reported that the unclear division of responsibility between FECAFOOT and MINSEP has directly stalled infrastructure development. A former player and coach explained:

"Government owns most infrastructure, but FECAFOOT is supposed to develop football. When they fight over who does what, nothing gets built. The president promised ten stadiums, but because the ministry controls the land and permits, and FECAFOOT has no independent fund, the stadiums remain on paper."

Respondent 12 noted that "FECAFOOT rents fields from government and schools" rather than owning its own facilities, limiting long-term development planning. A referee added that "divisional headquarters lack facilities entirely" because neither institution takes clear responsibility for regional development.

Absence of Youth and Grassroots Development Pathways

Participants consistently reported that the government-federation power struggle has crippled youth development. Respondent 13 stated bluntly: "We don't have youth leagues because there is no agreement on who funds and who runs them." A sports journalist elaborated:

"MINSEP says FECAFOOT should develop youth football because it is the technical federation. FECAFOOT says MINSEP has the money and should pay. While they argue, an entire generation of young players has no competitive pathway from grassroots to elite."

Respondent 12 admitted that "grassroots clubs receive no subvention at all," while Respondent 14 confirmed that "subvention is only for elite clubs, not for grassroots." A former FECAFOOT vice president concluded that "grassroots football in Cameroon is almost non-existent because the government and federation cannot agree on a shared vision."

Referee Development Neglected Amid Institutional Conflict

The conflict between FECAFOOT and MINSEP has also affected referee development. An Elite One referee explained:

"Referees are not paid on time because FECAFOOT blames delayed government subsidies, and MINSEP



blames FECAFOOT for poor financial management. While they blame each other, we officiate matches without transport money or equipment. There is no referee training programme because neither wants to fund it."

Respondent 9 noted that "no equipment is given to referees" and that "referee training has stopped entirely" due to the unresolved funding dispute between the two institutions.

Club Development Undermined by Financial Uncertainty

Respondents reported that clubs cannot develop because they are caught between FECAFOOT and MINSEP. A club president stated:

"We are promised subventions by FECAFOOT, but they say the government has not released funds. We go to MINSEP, and they say FECAFOOT has not submitted proper reports. While they fight, we cannot pay players, maintain training grounds, or plan for the future. Club development has stopped."

Respondent 11 observed that "clubs have no financial stability" and that "players leave because salaries are not guaranteed," directly attributing this to the dysfunctional relationship between the two institutions.

Long-Term Football Development Lacks Coherent Direction

Finally, participants consistently described the absence of any coherent long-term development plan. A former MINSEP secretary general admitted:

"There is no shared vision between FECAFOOT and MINSEP for where Cameroonian football should be in ten years. Each president comes with his own plan. Each minister has his own priority. Without a shared development framework that both institutions respect, football will continue to decline."

Respondent 11 summarised the perception shared across most participants: "No clear roadmap, no accountability, no transparency. Development cannot happen when the government and federation are always fighting."

In essence, stakeholders perceive the FECAFOOT-government relationship as a direct impediment to football development. Infrastructure remains stalled, youth pathways are absent, referees are neglected, clubs are unstable, and long-term planning is non-existent. Until the relationship is clarified and stabilised, development will remain impossible.

4.2 Discussion

Drawing on the findings from diverse stakeholder groups, the study reveals that the governance crisis within FECAFOOT is not an isolated administrative problem but a multidimensional structural issue affecting policy formulation, institutional relations, and football development simultaneously. Across the three research objectives, respondents consistently pointed to a federation that possesses elaborate statutory organs in theory but experiences deep practical shortcomings in transparency, inclusiveness, implementation, and institutional coherence.

The first objective demonstrates that FECAFOOT's governance strategies are heavily president-centred. This finding is consistent with sport governance scholarship which argues that many national sport federations increasingly exhibit strong presidential governance where formal boards exist, but decision-making is centralized around a dominant executive authority (Ghodhbani & Souissi, 2025; Solanellas et al., 2024). The FECAFOOT case demonstrates that while the General Assembly and Executive Committee are formally operational, participants viewed these structures as confirmatory rather than deliberative. This confirms that FECAFOOT may formally satisfy structural governance requirements yet fall short of

substantive principles such as balanced power distribution and internal accountability. The study also found that policy implementation remains significantly weaker than policy declarations. This implementation deficit is central in sport policy theory, where Viollet, Bayle, and Claussier (2023) argue that national federation sport policy is meaningful only when matched by sustained implementation capacity. FECAFOOT appears policy-rich but execution-poor, suggesting weak monitoring systems and politicized priorities. Stakeholder participation within FECAFOOT remains formal rather than substantive.

The second objective reveals a classic governance dualism. Virtually all respondents described the FECAFOOT-MINSEP relationship as tense and conflictual. Okunola (2024) and Thompson et al. (2022) show that national sport federations in developing contexts often operate in a semi-autonomous zone, legally independent but practically constrained by state funding. At the centre of this contradiction lies the 2014 Convention, which respondents identified as the legal nucleus of misunderstanding. Rather than resolving authority, the convention institutionalized dual control, creating what Mercado Jaén, Smirnova, Preuss, Könecke, and Winand (2025) call contested authority regimes. The Marc Brys controversy became a visible symbol of deeper constitutional uncertainty.

The third objective provides stakeholder perceptions of how this contested relationship directly impedes football development in Cameroon. Respondents consistently linked the FECAFOOT-government power struggle to specific developmental failures. First, infrastructure development remains stalled due to legal ambiguity over responsibility. As one participant explained, government owns most infrastructure but FECAFOOT is supposed to develop football, yet when the two institutions fight over who does what, nothing gets built. Second, youth and grassroots development pathways are absent because there is no agreement on who funds and who runs youth leagues. A sports journalist noted that while MINSEP and FECAFOOT argue over responsibility, an entire generation of young players has no competitive pathway from grassroots to elite level. Third, referee development is neglected amid institutional conflict, with referees receiving no equipment, training, or timely payments as each institution blames the other for funding delays. Fourth, club development is undermined by financial uncertainty, with clubs caught between unfulfilled FECAFOOT promises and delayed government subventions. Finally, long-term football development lacks any coherent direction because there is no shared vision between the two institutions for where Cameroonian football should be in ten years. These findings support Ghodhbani and Souissi (2025) that governance architecture significantly shapes organizational outcomes. A striking finding is the linkage between institutional conflict and developmental stagnation, where the absence of a stable, cooperative relationship between federation and government directly prevents infrastructure construction, youth pathway establishment, referee training, and club stability.

In essence, the study confirms that in sport federations, development outcomes are fundamentally governance outcomes. The federation appears structurally organized but substantively fragile, and its relationship with MINSEP remains legally shared but politically adversarial. The neglect of grassroots football, youth development, referee welfare, and infrastructure represents not separate failures but a unified consequence of unresolved governance contradictions between FECAFOOT and the state. Until the relationship is clarified and stabilised through legal revision and genuine cooperation, football development in Cameroon will remain impossible.

4.3 Implications of the Study

From a theoretical perspective, the study contributes to sport governance literature by demonstrating that the mere presence of statutory structures does not translate into good governance. FECAFOOT provides a strong African case of formal institutionalism existing alongside practical centralization and weak implementation, reinforcing the distinction between procedural and substantive governance.

From a policy perspective, football reform in Cameroon requires systemic institutional redesign, particularly in accountability systems, state-federation legal relations, and long-term football planning. Policymakers should recognize that administrative stability and transparent governance are preconditions for sustainable success.

From a practical management perspective, poor governance directly affects club competitiveness, referee performance, player morale, league credibility, and national team preparation. Football performance should be evaluated through the quality of governance systems behind the field.

For stakeholders, the study highlights the urgent need for broader participatory governance. Players, referees, clubs, journalists, grassroots actors, and supporters are central contributors to football sustainability. Their continued exclusion weakens institutional legitimacy.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion and Recommendation

5.1 Conclusion

This study examined governance and organisational performance in Cameroonian football through a qualitative assessment of FECAFOOT's strategies, its institutional relationship with MINSEP, and the effects of current governance practices. The study reveals that FECAFOOT's governance is marked by a significant contradiction between formal institutional existence and practical operational effectiveness.

Under the first objective, the findings demonstrate that while FECAFOOT possesses constitutional organs suggesting a formally structured federation, practical governance is highly centralised around the federation president. Policy implementation is considerably weaker than policy formulation, with strategic declarations on infrastructure, league professionalisation, and grassroots development remaining largely unfulfilled. The second objective established that the relationship between FECAFOOT and MINSEP is characterised by continuous administrative rivalry rather than partnership. The 2014 Convention, intended to define collaborative responsibilities, has become the legal foundation for recurrent misunderstanding. FECAFOOT's heavy dependence on government financing significantly reduces its operational autonomy, and accountability mechanisms remain largely internalised and inaccessible to the public.

The third objective showed that stakeholders perceive this relationship as directly impeding football development through stalled infrastructure, absent youth pathways, neglected referee development, and unstable club funding. Financial mismanagement destabilises clubs, referee neglect contributes to controversial officiating, and Cameroonian clubs struggle in CAF competitions. National team performance is affected by administrative interference, coaching instability, and biased player selection.

The study concludes that the fundamental challenge facing Cameroonian football is not the absence of institutions or legal texts, but the weak transformation of formal structures into transparent, inclusive, accountable governance. FECAFOOT remains structurally organised but substantively constrained by centralisation, implementation inefficiency, institutional mistrust, and limited stakeholder confidence.

5.2 Recommendations

First, FECAFOOT should undertake internal governance reforms to reduce presidential centralisation and strengthen constitutional organs, moving from personality-driven to institution-driven administration.

Second, FECAFOOT must develop a comprehensive long-term national football development masterplan with measurable targets over a ten- to fifteen-year period, independent of electoral cycles.

Third, financial transparency must become a non-negotiable priority. FECAFOOT should publish annual audited financial reports accessible to the public.

Fourth, a more equitable resource distribution policy should be established, including a ring-fenced grassroots football development fund.

Fifth, FECAFOOT and MINSEP should jointly revisit and legally clarify the 2014 Convention to eliminate overlapping authority.

FECAFOOT should secure TV rights and brand the league; with this, we will get more sponsorship.

FECAFOOT should convince the state to invest more money in the league.

There should be good governance that's financial accountability, transparency, democracy, fairness and effectiveness in all decision-making.

The league and cup of Cameroon should follow the same calendar program of CAF.

FECAFOOT should call for reconciliation, bringing back all the actors of football, all the stakeholders that matter, and letting all grievances be solved.

Also put people who are competent to manage the various communities or organs that organise our football in Cameroon; we should forget about issues of nepotism and tribalism.

FECAFOOT should manage his affairs and allow clubs to manage theirs.

5.3 Limitation and Future Research

The present research has several limitations that offer avenues for future research. First, the single-case study design limits the generalizability of the findings. This thesis focused exclusively on FECAFOOT within the specific political, economic, and cultural context of Cameroon. Therefore, the findings may not transfer directly to other African football federations with different governance histories, legal frameworks, or levels of FIFA intervention. Future research should replicate this study in other Sub-Saharan African countries to determine whether the patterns of executive centralisation, government interference, and stakeholder exclusion observed here are consistent across similar developing football systems or specific to Cameroon.

Also, the study's theoretical framework was limited to stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984). The theory does not fully explain why FIFA's institutional pressures have failed to produce governance convergence. A multi-theoretic approach combining stakeholder, institutional, and resource dependence perspectives would provide a more complete explanation of FECAFOOT's governance challenges.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Semi Structured Interview Questions for all Participants

Research Q/objectives	An aspect of governance is investigated	Information needed	Interview Questions
1. How is the Cameroon Football Federation (FECAFOOT) governed?	Institutional Design & Stakeholder Power Balance	Holistic Framework: Structure of power distribution and the role of stakeholders in the governing hierarchy.	1. Who informs the provision of football governance within FECAFOOT? 2. Who is officially involved in the decision-making process to develop football participation and elite performance? 3. What do you think about the current FECAFOOT decision-making process? Is it inclusive?
Objective 1: To analyse the strategies or policies of FECAFOOT.	Policy Transparency & Strategic Planning Inclusion & Engagement	Understanding how policies are created and if stakeholders (clubs/players) are involved in the process. Evidence of formal statutes vs. actual strategic planning. Fairness: Involvement of clubs in drafting policy.	4 How is football governed? Is it through formal statutes or a specific strategic document? 5. Who provides the football facilities and infrastructure? What kind of facilities exist for the leagues? 6. What do you think about the current football facilities? Is it sufficient for all clubs and national teams? 7. Do you have specific sports policies in FECAFOOT? Are they standalone or part of the statutes? 8. Who forms the federation's sports policy? 9. Is there a governance block or an existing strategic plan to develop professional football? 10. Are all stakeholders (Elite clubs, Women's football (Grassroots) participating in federation programs? 11. Do you think stakeholders' Is participation and resource distribution fair within the federation?
Objective 2: To analyse the relationship between FECAFOOT and the	Political Autonomy & External	Ensures Accountability: How the federation balances FIFA's autonomy rules with dependence	12. What competition stages (Internal and External) does the federation participate in?



government.	Interference	on Ministry (MINSEP) funding. Identifying the level of independence that the federation has from the Ministry of Sports (MINSEP).	13. Who organises the competitions and manages the relationship between FECAFOOT and the Ministry of Sports? 14. What rules do you have in football participation in terms of age, gender, and administrative behaviors? 15. Do you have an annual sports financial report that is shared with stakeholders? 16. How do you practice accountability between the federation and the government?
Objective 3: To describe stakeholder perceptions of how the relationship between FECAFOOT and the government influences football development in Cameroon.	Operational Effectiveness & Outcome accountability	Transparency: How results are relayed to stakeholders. Fairness: Distribution of resources (sponsorships) across all Evaluating how administrative choices impact the success of the National Team and grassroots development.	17. To what extent do you evaluate the administration's performance in terms of utilizing financial and material resources? 18. What do you think about the administration's support for increasing football participation at the grassroots level? 19. How do you relay the results and administration responsibilities regarding the National Teams to the stakeholders? 20. How do you get information about the programs, competitions, and results? Is the process fair? 21. If you are part of the decision-making process, how do you think your contribution assists in increasing the overall organisational performance?

Thank you for your Participation