ABUSE OF TRADE SECRET REGIMES: GOVERNANCE TRANSPARENCY LOSS AND FOREIGN POLICY RISK DYNAMICS ACROSS 60 MODELS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17854916Keywords:
Trade Secrecy, Governance Transparency, Accountability, Foreign Policy Risk, Public Resource ExploitationAbstract
This study analytically examines how the concept of trade secrecy has deviated from its legitimate legal foundation and transformed into an instrument that facilitates the exploitation of public resources. The research categorizes the misuse patterns of trade secret regimes through sixty distinct models, aiming to reveal the destructive effects of these practices on governance transparency and the risk dynamics they generate in the foreign policy domain. The central research question is as follows: How does the systematic abuse of trade secrecy weaken both a country's internal governance quality and its position in the international arena? To address this question, a qualitative research methodology was adopted, and sixty models of abuse were comprehensively examined through document analysis and conceptual analysis techniques. The study's hypothesis posits that the systematic use of the trade secret shield renders accountability mechanisms dysfunctional, thereby degrading governance quality, which in turn erodes the country's bargaining power, reputation, and credibility in the international arena. The findings demonstrate that the trade secret concept functions as a shield that effectively disables democratic oversight across a broad spectrum ranging from non-performing public loans to energy purchase guarantees, from public procurement to privatization processes. The research establishes that the information asymmetry created by this secrecy regime undermines institutional trust, generates inequity in resource allocation, and ultimately constrains the state's room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. The study contributes originally to the literature by offering recommendations for the reinstatement of transparency principles, including legal reforms, strengthening of independent audit mechanisms, and the establishment of a culture of public accountability.
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